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Shipbuilding for the Navy.’’ 
By LORD BRASSEY, E.C,B,, D.C,L,, Assoc. Inst. C.E. 
THE Institution of Civil Engineers does not deal with public 
finance. The subject cannot, however, be disregarded in dealing 
with  shipbuilding for the Navy. The handsome surpluses of 
the past no longer exist, and  the  change is mainly  due  to 
increasing  military  expenditure. 
The Report of the Committee of the Chamber of Deputies on 
the  French  Navy  Estimates for 1905 furnishes  the following 
Table,  which  gives  grave cause for reflection. 
RATIO OB MILITARY TO AGGREQATE PUBLIC EXPENDITURN. 
- I 1895 I 1904 1 Increase. 
Per Cent. Per Cent. Per Cent. Per Cent. 
Decrease. -- - -__------ 
United  Eingdom , . . . 
Russia . . . A . . 1 22.53 1 21.77 .. Italy . . . . . , . 25-86 
France . . . . 26.53 
United State8 . . . . . 
5.61 40.29 34.68 Germany . . , . . . 
.. 11.06 50.97  39.91 
.. 
’ 19.18 31’08 11.90 ~ .. 
Even for the Navy, expenditure should be watched with care, 
and reductions should be possible without outting down appro- 
priations  to  essential purposes. 
In  the most important classes of ships Qreat Britain holds a 
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commanding position. The latest official summary-which does 
not take  into account the losses in the Russo-Japanese war-is as 
under. 
COMPARATIVE TABTLAR STATEUENT OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF TIIE 
FLEETS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA, GERXANY, ITALY, UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, ND JAPAN. 
- 
Built. 
l3attlcships, 1st-class . . 
moured , . . . . . Coast-defence vessels, Ar- 
1 2 ,, 3rd ,, . . 4 I 9 ,, 2nd ,, . . 
49 1 20 
) 1 14 
Cruisers, Armoured . . . 28 15 
,, Protected,  1st-class 21 7 
3, ,, 2nd ,, 49l  16 
1, ,, 3rd ,, 32'  17 
Torpedo-Vessels . . . . 32 16 * ,, Unprotected . . 8 1 
Torpedo-Boat-Destroyers . 124 24 
Torpedo-Boats . . . . S7 j 233 Submarines . . . . . S 1 26 
16 
4 
1 
14 
8 
5 
31 
2 
3 
47 
9 
167 
1 
14 
4 
12 
11 
4 
8 
1 
20 
13  
2 
37 
86 
14  
Building. 
)~ G 9 l{ :3 
.. ' {  H5 
Battlcshipe, 1st-clsss . . l( 
Cruisers,  Armoured . . { '43, 
,, Protected,  1st-class 
9, ,, 3rd ,, 
.. 
,, ,, 2nd ,, :: 1 .? ~ :: 2 4 
Scouts . . . . . . 
.. 4 ~{ ;j6 ]~ . . Torpedo-Boats . . . . ( :5 }~ 14 , 6j 
Torpedo-Boat-Destroyers . 
8 .. .. , .. 
Submarines . . . . . ( j 1, 140 .. l 
13 j 11 
I .. 
3 
.. 
5 
5 
It: 2 
1 
11 
14 
138 
1 
.. 
11 
2 
3 
15 
2 
7 
20 
31 
S 
.. 
.. 
F 
1 .. 
2 
8 
12 
8 
9 
1 
l 9  
32 .. 
.. .. 
.. .. ' .. 
2 , .. l 1  
Including one torpedo-depot ship. 
It is not certain  whether  the  building of all  these has been  actually begun. 
A decision has  recently been arrived a t  to strike protected ships 
off the  list in large numbers. While  the policy of putting  the less 
effective types  out of commission, and reinforcing the squadrons 
with modern vessels, should command approval, erasures from the 
Navy List should not be pushed too far. If  the vessels are sent 
to  outlying anchorages,  care  should  be taken  that  they are kept flt 
' Including one partially protected. Including two partially protcctod. 
K To be laid down 1904-1905. 
Experimental. 
Downloaded by [ UNIV OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN] on [21/09/16]. Copyright © ICE Publishing, all rights reserved.
proceedings.j BRASSEY oh SI~IPBUILDINC $OR !i%g NAPft. 3 
for  service in  the emergency of war,  when  the casualties must be 
numerous ; for the power which  has  large reserves of ships  must 
possess a great advantage. 
Every naval administrator must wish that British ships had 
a longer tenure on the list of effectives. To one who served 
at  the Admiralty when the battleships of the “Admiral” class 
and the belted cruisers were laid down, i t  is hard to see them 
becoming obsolete 60 soon. The protected  cruisers are of even 
later date. In  the last 20 years more than 17 millions sterling 
have been expended on vessels on which reliance is no longer 
placed. There  are  naval  architects of renown among the members 
of the Institution of Civil Engineers : can they  throw more 
light on the  future of naval construction than  has been obtainable 
in  the  past?  There  is no surer way to economy than to build of 
the best quality,  and  to look as far  as possible into  the  future  in 
the preparation of designs. The criticisms of the French Com- 
mittee on Estimates on the designs for some recent ships, and on 
their  structural defects, are  full of warning for all who have to  
deal  with problems of construction, whether  in  Parliament or a t  
the  drawing-table. 
Shipbuilding for the Navy must necessarily be an answer to 
construction in  hand elsewhere. There  are navies  which England 
must be prepared to meet, and which it is therefore the  duty of 
the  Admiralty closely to watch. As a first step  in  the considera- 
tion of the  types  which should be laid down  for the  British Navy, 
the work in progress for foreign  navies may be passed in  review. 
The  list below is compiled from the  latest  Admiralty  return. 
First-class  battleships 
Armoured cruisers . 
I 
Effort, it is apparent, is concentrated everywhere on battleships 
and armoured cruisers. Protected cruisers are disappearing. 
No ships now bcing  built  are  without protection by  vertical  armour. 
The  ships  in course of construction embody the ideas prevailing 
at  the  time  when  they were designed. For indications as  to 
future developments the  Report of the Committee on the  French 
Estimates,  to  which reference has  already been made, is of special 
interest. It deals at length with shipbuilding policy. I n  France, 
as in other countries, some authorities are for battleships, others 
B 2  
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for armoured cruisers. I n  the judgment of the Committee the 
solution  may  be found in  a type  in which the  distinctive charac; 
teristics of the  battleship  and  the  cruiser  will be, as  far  as possible, 
combined. Such  a type  is represented in  France  by  the ‘L Edgard 
Quinet,” of 14,000 tons, in the United States Navy by the four 
ships of the “North Carolina” class, of 14,500 tons, and in the 
British  Navy  by  the  three  ships of the “ Ninotaur ” class, of 14,600 
tons, and the six ships of the (‘ Duke of Edinburgh ” class, of 
13,550 tons. 
It is the  aim of the  naval  administration of France to  complete 
annually three first-class ships. If  al l  three were battleships of 
the latest type, costing more than 51,500,000 each, the French 
Navy estimates would be unduly burdened. The French Com- 
mittee recommend that  the  annual  shipbuilding programme  should 
provide for two  battleships only, the  third vessel being of a less 
costly kind, yet not ineffective for the naval service. Armament 
and armour would be the same for both classes, the main arma- 
ment  being  two 12-inch or 10-inch guns of the  latest  pattern,  and 
the secondary armament 6-inch guns. All guns would be pro- 
tected  by  armour, those on the  upper deck being  in  turrets,  and 
those on the main deck in casemates and  an armoured battery. As 
to  protection,  a pamphlet  entitled “ Canons et blindages,” recently 
published by General Puel, Director of R’aval Ordnance at the 
French  Admiralty, is cited  as  authority for reducing  armour 
to two-thirds of the thickness now insisted upon in battleships. 
I t  is held that 8-inch armour should be sufficient. Both classes 
of vessels would be designed  to  steam at  high speeds. 
Guns, armour, and speed being  the same, the  two  types would 
differ chiefly in  tonnage. For  the larger vessels a displacement 
of 15,000 tons is proposed, thus giving the coal-endurance and 
the power of carrying supplies of ammunition  and stores for 
extended ocean cruising. The smaller vessels, with a  displace- 
ment of 10,000 tons  and  limited supplies, would be  specially 
designed  for the seas of Europe. 
The four vessels of the “Vittorio Emanuele 111.” type, now 
under  construction for the  Italian  Navy,  have been specially 
commended by  naval  experts, a8 combining the  armour  and 
armament of the  battleship  with  the speed and coal-endurance of 
the cruiser. The chief features of their design are : displacement, 
12,425 tons ; speed, 22 knots ; armament,  two  12-inch  and  twelve 
8-inch guns, with  quick-firers;  belt  and  upper works  protected by 
armour, tapering in thickness from 99 inches to 4 inches ; cost 
S1,120,000. The Frenah Committee refer to the Italian designs 
as being  very  suitable for their own navy. 
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The  Italian  battleships formed the subject of a Paper  by  Admiral 
Sir John Hopkins,  read at  the Royal  United  Service Institution on 
the  FthFebruary, 1902. Indescribing  the“Vittorio  EmanueleIII.,” 
the  features on whioh Admiral  Hopkins specially insisted mere the 
reduced cost, as compared with  the “ Eing Edward VII.,” a vessel 
contemporary with  the ‘ L  RQpublique ’’ type of France,  the complete 
belt of 10-inch armour, the protection of all guns by barbettes 
or turrets, the ample coal-supply of 2,800 tons, and  the speed of 
22 knots per hour,  giving  an  advantage of 3 knots over all  battle- 
ships then building for foreign navies. Something was probably 
gained in  the  Italian  ship from the  greater length-six times the 
beam, as compared with five and a half times, the  usual proportion 
in  British vessels. 
In  the opinion of Captain Mahan, battleships must be built 
in  numbers, and they ought to give mutual support. Sir John 
Hopkins spoke strongly for an advantage in numbers ; and he 
summed up  the position thus :-If we  can get  all we want  in  the 
larger ship, and cannot get i t  in the smaller ship, the bigger 
ship is desirable : on the  other  hand,  when  thinking of torpedoes 
and rams, grave consideration must be given to the heavy loss 
resulting from the  destruction of the  larger ships. Admiral 
Sir  Edmund  Fremantle followed on the same side : he would have 
thought  that,  when  the  building of 14,000-ton ships was begun  under 
the  Naval Defence Act of 1889, the more reasonable thing would 
have been to  build a limited  number of ships of 14,000 tons, and a 
large  number of vessels of 11,000 to 12,000 tons. Sir Edmund  Fre- 
mantle was anticipating,  with a rare  gift of prophecy, the recom- 
mendations of the  latest Committee on the  French  Navy Estimates. 
Other authorities may be quoted. Mr. H. G. Gillmor,2 after 
comparing the  ships  building for all navies,  assigns the first 
place to  the  “Vittorio  Emanuele 111.” Mr. Jane observes : 
Strategically, vessels of this  type  are  the finest warships 
in  the world. Tactically considered, they  are  extremely  well 
protected, and their very high speed should tell. . . . Unless B 
rapid rate of fire is secured with the single 12-inch guns, the 
ship is likely to feel her loss of two heavy pieces. Few ships, 
however, seem so well designed to stand heavy gun attack.” SO, 
too, Le Yacht: With a  protection consisting of a wide and 
1 “ Is a Second-Class or smaller Battleship desirable ? ” Journal of the Royal 
2 Seientijc American Supplement, vol. lii. (1901), p. 21673. 
3 p .  T. Jane, ‘‘ 411 the Woyld’s Fight;ing Ships,” !904, p 234. 
United  Service  Institution, vol. xlvi. p. 657. 
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complete  armoured belt of adequate thickness,  namely, 9 m 8-inch and 
7.8-inch, well designed defensive power, an extensive radius of 
action, and a speed equal  to  that of the best, cruisers, the ‘ Vittorio 
Emanuele ’ would be muoh superior to the cruisers proposed in  
the  French  Naval programme.” 
With limited resources, the Italian constructors have borne a 
leading part in the evolution of armoured shipbuilding. Their 
ships  have been remarkable for boldness of conception and 
excellence of workmanship. They are well satisfied with their 
latest production. The design for the “ Vittorio Emanuele 111.” 
was prepared under  the  direction of Admiral Morin, Minister of 
Marine, the aim having been to produce a  powerful vessel of war, 
of relatively moderate dimensions and cost. The considerations 
in view have been set  forth in an  interesting  Paper  by Colonel 
V. E. Cuniberti. I t  was easy enough to increase the number of 
eggs-in other words, to increase the fighting-efficiency-when 
the basket  was  enlarged. Cost could  not, however, be disregarded, 
even by  the  wealthiest  nations;  and  there were  considerations of 
fighting efficiency. There was an  advantage  in  superior numbers. 
Considerations which must have great weight in Italy cannot 
be wholly disregarded by a British  naval  administration. No 
country is so wealthy  as  to  be  able  to make unlimited  appropria- 
tions  to new construction. The most despairing of pessimists 
could hardly propose that  England should  go beyond the combined 
shipbuilding of France, Germany, and Russia. 
I n  growth of dimensions, Great  Britain,  departing  in these later 
days from the  shipbuilding policy of the  age of Nelson and Colling- 
wood, has ever  led the way. There is no cause to speak disparagingly 
of the  big ships, nor to wish  that  there were one less on the  British 
Navy  List.  England’s  constructors  have served their  country well. 
The nation has had in succession Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, Sir 
William White, and Mr. Philip Watts. Such men never stand 
still.  They  have  not been restricted  as to dimensions. Parliament 
has been  liberal. The Government has been encouraged by 
popular  sentiment-rather be i t  said by sound public opinion-to 
spend freely on the Navy. I n  the hands of skilful naval archi- 
tects,  increased  dimensions give a more than  proportionate  gain i n  
fighting-efficiency. Each new design for British battleships has 
shown a marked advance upon the preceding type. There are 
none better  under  any flag. It may be claimed that  England  has 
led  the  way in these  splendid  creations of the  labour  and  ingenuity 
of man. Let  the  credit which i s  his  due be given to 8ir William 
White, 
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There  are  arguments on the  other side. In  the m618e of a naval 
battle, numbers must tell; and i f  the units are less oostly, they 
can  be  built  in  larger numbers. The  largest  ships  have no 
immunity from the  dangers of darkness  and of fog, from stranding 
and collision, from injury below the belt-from the blow of the 
ram  or  the torpedo, or  the explosion of submarine mines. In  the 
present war one Russian  and one-possibly two-Japanese battle- 
ships have been destroyed by mines. Three Russian battleships 
have been torpedoed. 
It is not  only below the  belt  that  the  large  ships  are  as  vulner- 
able as those of less dimensions. Conning-towers cannot afford 
perfect protection to commanders. The captain steering for an 
enemy must keep him always in  view. The risk of exposure 
must be faced. The most precious life is the most exposed: i t  is 
as the heel of Achilles. And then there are the hydrographical 
conditions-the many harbours which heavy ships cannot enter, 
and  the  long  stretches of coast which  they  cannot approach. T’he 
Baltic is a  shallow sea. English  ships  must pass to  and  fro 
through  the Suez Canal, difficult of approach through shoals and 
banks deposited by the mud-laden Nile. Much has been heard 
lately of the Korth Sea. Within the wide area lying between a 
line from the Texel to the Spurn, and from Cape Gris Nez to 
Dungeness, even for the boldest and most expert seaman navigation 
must be difficult with  ships of 20,000 tons in  charge. 
In  the discussion on the Paper by Sir John Hopkins, already 
referred to, Sir Edmund  Fremantle  laid  stress upon the hindrances 
to the action of any fleet consisting of ships of deep draught. 
Copenhagen and the Nile were fought in shallow waters. And, 
to quote some later experiences, when Sir Geoffrey Hornby led 
the  Mediterranean fleet into  the Sea of Marmora, his flagship lay 
for some hours  aground  in  the  narrows of the Dardanelles under 
the fire of the,Turkish  guns. So, too, at  the bombardment of the 
forts of Alexandria, only two  ships could cross the bar, and close 
with  the  works erected by Arabi Pasha. The fire from the 
‘c Condor,’’ in a well-chosen position, was more effective than  that 
from heavier  ships a t  too great a  distance. 
And  there  may be assailants  which it will  be difficult for  the 
heavy  battleships  to  keep a t  bay. Unarmoured destroyers cannot 
withstand  the  hail of bullets  from  their  quick-firing  armaments; 
but a determined attack by a group of destroyers protected by 
armour-say armoured torpedo-rams-might be very formidable. 
The armoured  torpedo-ram is no new conception. The “Poly- 
phemus” was a first specimen af the type, Faults-iuovitable 
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when  all is novel-might be corrected. It should not  be  difficult 
to design a vessel of the same class, heavily armoured, of high 
speed, armed with torpedo-tubes and  with one heavy  gun  in 
the bows. Many might be built for the cost of one battleship. 
Armoured rams  might do more than  the  heavy  ships to decide the 
issue of a hard-fought day. 
A few words on submarines seem to be  called for. There 
is a consensus of opinion that they are valuable for harbour- 
defence : ability to navigate the seas has yet to be proved. I n  
a sense, it may be said that the submarine is the arm of the 
feeble ; it is essentially a defensive weapon. The British Admi- 
ralty  has  never been foremost in the  construction of such vessels. 
There was hesitation  in  the case of the  submarines ; but a decision 
having been come to  that  they  were  required for the Navy, 
building has been  pushed forward vigorously. The official list 
from which  the foregoing  figures have been taken  gives  the  number 
of submarines  built  or  under  construction  for  the  British  Navy a t
twenty-nine. The Committee on the French Navy Estimates for 
1905 contrast  the  hesitating policy of their  own  country  with  the 
more decisive action taken on this side of the Channel. France 
has been building submarines since 1886. h 18 years she has 
fifty-eight submarines, built or being built, while Great Britain 
in  5 years has, as  stated, a total of twenty-nine. In the presence of 
eminent professional authorities, i t  is not necessary for a layman 
to  say more on such a highly  technical problem. 
As already said, Great Britain has led the way in increasing 
dimensions. All the battleships now under construction for the 
British  Navy  are  ships of 17,000 tons, their cost, in  round figures, 
being not less than S1,500,000 each. Five  battleships of 
similar cost and displacement are being built for the French 
Navy. France has followed with reluctance. The eight largest 
battleships now building for Germany  are those of the ‘I Deutsch- 
land ” and “ Braunschweig ” classes, of 13,200 tons. The  battle- 
ships  built for Germany are not rated as inefficient. The  Italian 
ships, as  already  pointed out, are of less dimensions. An illustra- 
tion of what is contended for may be given. Assume that it is 
required to  reinforce the  Navy  by  putting afloat  a given  number of 
guns of a certain  calibre  and mounted  behind  armour. Assume an 
irreducible minimum of speed. Is it better to concentrate the 
required  number of guns  in  few ships, or  to  distribute those guns in 
more ships?  The  armament of the Lord Nelson ” consists of four 
12-inch and  ten 9 -2-inch guns. The same guns could be mounted 
in  two  ships of the ‘‘ Vittorio Emwnlele 111.” type. The cost af 
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the  “King  Edward VII.” may be taken  at 51,500,000 ; the cost of 
two  ships of the  Italian  type would be 52,000,000. Is the 
advantage of two  ships  to one worth  the  extra cost ? The  Author 
submits that the answer should be in the affirmative. Looking 
to  the  maritime powers of Europe as those which  England  must 
be  prepared to meet, i t  does not  appear necessary that  all  fighting 
ships of the  British  Navy should be of the same dimensions, and 
as costly as the  latest types. Appropriations to new construction 
cannot be unlimited. It would seem desirable that some of the 
British  battleships should  be of the same type  as those now being 
built for Italy  and Germany. It is not for a revolution in  
shipbuilding policy that the Author would contend; but it does 
appear desirable that some vessels should be  adapted for narrow 
and shallow  waters. 
The cruisers may  next be considered;  but  not  with a view  to 
criticism of any vessels now under construction. The  latest  British 
examples will  well  bear comparison with those under construction 
elsewhere. They steam 22 knots;  they  are  well protected by 
armour,  and  are powerfully  armed. I n  the  cruiser class two  types 
are necessary. I n  the  scouts of the fleet, speed and coal-endurance 
are  the essential qualities. I n  cruisers for the protection of 
commerce, fighting-efficiency must be combined with speed and 
coal-endurance. 
Dealing first with  the armoured type,  the dimensions must  be 
large. Cruisers for the protection of commerce must range the 
open ocean. They are not exposed, in the same degree as battle- 
ships  must be, to  the  risk of destruction  by  the  ram,  the torpedo, 
or the submarine mine. In   the  opinion of the Committee on the 
French Navy estimates, speed, protection, armament, and long 
coal-endurance necessitate displacements of 15,000 tons. England 
needs powerful  armoured  cruisers, nor is the  Admiralty  neglecting 
to  build them. The list of cruisers now building includes three 
ships of the ‘‘ Minotaur ” class, of 14,600 tons, and six of the 
“ Duke of Edinburgh ” class, of 13,550 tons. I n  addition, there 
are on the  Navy  List  four armoured  cruisers of the “ Drake ’’ class, 
of 14,100 tons, and the “Powerful” and “ Terrible,” of similar 
tonnage. For  the  French  Navy one large armoured cruiser only, 
the ‘‘ Edgard Quinet,” has been laid down. For  the German Navy 
two ships of 11,200 tons are proposed. It may be argued that 
the British cruisers, though of much larger dimensions, are not 
superior  in fighting-efficiency to  the  Italian battleships. The 
superiority of the British ships would be found in their sea- 
keeping qualities-in their  high freeboard-very necesswy  fpr ths 
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health of crews on long cruises, and  giving a great  advantage  in 
steaming head to sea. 
Turning  to  cruisers for scouting  duties,  as  the dimensions 
advance, the  numbers  which  the  wealthiest  nation can build  must 
be less. Can scouts be supplied to the Navy without specially 
building for this service? As a first reserve of scouts for the 
fleet, the numerous British  cruisers protected by armoured decks, 
but without sufficient protection by vertical armour, would be 
looked to. With the increasing power of quick-firing guns and 
explosive shell,  such vessels, as  the experiences of the  war  in  the 
Far  East  have shown,  can hardly be reckoned as combatants. The 
“ Rossia”-fast, heavily armed, but  without sufficient protection 
-was compelled to retreat before the Japanese squadron into 
Vladivostock, and  the “ Rurik ” was  sunk. 
Looking next outside the Navy, the mercantile auxiliary has 
not been in  favour. The annual subsidies are grudgingly paid; 
and naval opinion is sceptical as to the value of these ships. 
On the  list of reserve cruisers some vessels have been put  which 
should not be there: it is the ocean greyhound, and only the 
greyhound,  that is needed for the Navy. If  the  ships were 
selected with more care, the mercantile auxiliary might be of 
great value. Valuable professional advice is  available in  this 
matter. I n  giving evidence before the  Select Committee on 
Steamship Subsidies Lord Charles Beresford said :-“ The word 
‘ cruiser ’ is a  mistake. The words ‘ armoured cruiser’ are a 
greater mistake, and the only use these vessels can be to us in 
war, as admirals fighting the nation’s battles, is for the lines of 
communication. An Admiral can say  to one of them  (taking 
the question of the French fleet leaving Cherbourg), ‘ Go to 
Cherbourg, let me know when  they leave, and you must be back 
here  in so many hours, at  Gibraltar or Malta, after  leaving 
Cherbourg.’ Those ships can do it; there are no other ships in  
the world that can do it better than the ocean greyhounds that 
are  built for speed in  any  weather.  That  is  their  utility.” 
Lord Charles Beresford asked for eight ships. In the stress of 
war,  when  the success of all  the operations undertaken must essen- 
tially  depend on the completeness of the  information obtained as  to 
an enemy’s movements, more than  eight  ships would be required. 
“More frigates ! More frigates ! ” was the memorable cry of 
Nelson, paralysed by  the lack of news. 
In this connection the  Author  may  refer briefly to  the policy of 
steamship-subsidies, recently considered by a Committee of the 
House o f  Comwops, though mainly in relatiop tg trade. Ig tbg, 
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present  Paper  naval  requirements  are  the chief consideration. 
From this point of view the arguments are cogent in favour of 
liberality  in subsidies. Let  it  not be argued too strictly  with  the 
Colonies as to the amount and the incidence of subsidies. I t  
is a high imperial duty to connect by fast services Canada and 
Australia with the Motherland. Swift communications encourage 
and facilitate trade. An imperial postal service, running fort- 
nightly  to  Australia  and weekly to Canada, would form a splendid 
reserve of scouts for the Navy. I t  would be a bond of empire. 
The scouts might  be  utilized for the  training of naval  engineers 
and stokers. The valuable school of training formeriy afforded 
by  the  Indian  and  other troopships has ceased to exist. 
Proposals have been made for structural modifications, with a 
view to the protection of the auxiliary vessels by armour. The 
amount of protection which could be given  may  not be sufficient 
to  justify  the cost : the essential thing  is  the speed, which is the 
best security against capture. The subject was considered by a 
Committee appointed by the Admiralty. It would be interesting 
to know whether the opinions of members of the Committee are 
in  any  way changed in  view of recent experiences. 
To conclude. It is vain to hope for finality in shipbuilding. 
The progress of invention is unceasing ; and  with  every develop- 
ment in the propelling machinery, the  gun,  the torpedo, and 
the resistance of armour, designs  must be reconsidered. The 
best ship is a compromise. In the past a Committee of Design, 
formed outside the Admiralty, laid down a shipbuilding policy 
which,  as  Sir  William  White  has testified, was followed for many 
years. The  Admiralty  will  be  strengthened  by  the Special 
Committee on Designs recently appointed. I t  has been decided 
that  its proceedings shall  be confidential, and  therefore  they 
cannot aid in  forming  an  instructed  public opinion on the work 
of the Constructor’s department. This Institution is not under 
the same restrictions. I t  may, from time  to time, do good service 
by discussions on the  many professional questions connected with 
shipbuilding for the Savy. They are of exceeding complexity, 
and of momentous import to the country. It is well to hear all 
that  the  best men have  to say. 
No descriptions  having been given  to  Parliament  in  the  recent 
debates, the designs  for the  new  ships,  to be laid down in 1905-6, 
are probably still under revision. The  time seems opportune for 
examination and inquiry, and for the free exchange of views 
between experts not bound t9  ofhis1 secrecy, 
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